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1. In the Discourse on Metaphysics Leibniz put forward his famous complete-concept 
definition of substance. Sometimes this definition is glossed as stating that a substance is 
an entity with a concept so complete that it contains all its predicates, and it is thought 
that it folloǁs diƌeĐtlǇ fƌoŵ LeiďŶiz͛s theoƌǇ of tƌuth.2 Now, an adequate definition of 
substance should not apply to accidents. But, as I shall point out, if LeiďŶiz͛s theoƌǇ of 
truth is correct then an accident is an entity with a concept so complete that it contains all 
its pƌediĐates. The aiŵ of this papeƌ is to ĐlaƌifǇ LeiďŶiz͛s ŶotioŶ of suďstaŶĐe iŶ the 
Discourse with a view to explaining how that definition successfully distinguishes between 
substances and accidents. 
 The plan of the paper is as follows. In section 2 I shall present the relevant passage 
from the Discourse and discuss both the merely nominal definition of substance with 
which Leibniz begins the passage and his theory of truth. In section 3 I shall explain why on 
LeiďŶiz͛s theoƌǇ of tƌuth aŶ aĐĐideŶt is aŶ eŶtitǇ ǁith a ĐoŶĐept so Đoŵplete that it 
contains all its predicates. This ŵeaŶs that LeiďŶiz͛s defiŶitioŶ is iŶcorrect if it defines a 
substance as an entity with a concept so complete that it contains all its predicates. In 
seĐtioŶ 4 I shall aƌgue that appealiŶg to LeiďŶiz͛s NoŵiŶalisŵ is Ŷo ǁaǇ of saǀiŶg the 
definition of substance. In sections 5 and 6 I shall explaiŶ ǁhat LeiďŶiz͛s Đoŵplete-concept 
definition of substance really amounts to. The main task of these sections is to explain in 
what sense accidents have complete concepts that include all their predicates and in what 
sense they do not. In section 7 I shall consider an important note Leibniz wrote at the 
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margin of one of his letters to Arnauld and I shall elucidate it on the basis of my argument 
in section 6. In section 8 I shall consider some texts, previous to the Discourse, where 
Leibniz says that only substances have complete concepts that include all their predicates. 
I shall argue that the Discourse ĐaŶ theŶ ďe seeŶ as ƌepƌeseŶtiŶg aŶ eǀolutioŶ iŶ LeiďŶiz͛s 
thought on substance in the mid-ϭϲϴϬs. IŶ seĐtioŶ ϵ I shall eǆplaiŶ ǁhǇ, although LeiďŶiz͛s 
definition successfully distinguishes substances from accidents, it does not distinguish 
substances from substantial forms. Section 10 is a short conclusion. 
 
2. In Section 8 of the Discourse on Metaphysics Leibniz says the following: 
 
It is indeed true that when several predicates are attributed to the same 
subject and this subject is not attributed to any other, it is called an individual 
substance; but this is not sufficient, and such an explanation is merely nominal. It 
must therefore be considered what it is to be attributed truly to a certain subject. 
Now it is evident that all true predication has some ground in the nature of 
things, and when a proposition is not identical, that is, when the predicate is not 
explicitly contained in the subject, it must be contained in it virtually, and this is 
what the philosophers call in-esse, when they say that the predicate is in the 
subject. Thus the term of the subject must always include that of the predicate, so 
that he who understood perfectly the notion of the subject would also judge that 
the predicate belongs to it. 
This being so, we can say that the nature of an individual substance or of a 
complete being is to have a notion so complete that it should be sufficient to 
contain and to allow deduction from it of all the predicates of the subject to which 
this notion is attributed. Instead, the accident is a being whose notion does not 
include everything that can be attributed to the subject to which this notion is 
attributed. Thus, the quality of King that belongs to Alexander the Great, taken in 
abstraction from the subject, is not sufficiently determinate for one individual, and 
does not include the other qualities of the same subject, nor does it include 
everything that the notion of this prince contains…  (A VI.iv: 1540).3 
 
Here Leibniz starts with a preliminary definition of substance that has Aristotelian 
resonances: a substance is that subject which, although many predicates are truly 
attributed to it, it is not attributed to any other subject. Another way of putting this is that 
a substance is that subject which, although many predicates are predicated of it, it is not 
predicated of any other subject. Note that this is compatible with there being subjects of 
predication other than substances. Such subjects other than substances would be subjects 
of attribution or predication that are attributed to, or predicated of, other subjects. 
Although Leibniz does not mention this possibility explicitly, I think it is not implausible, 
given the Aristotelian resonances of the definition and what Leibniz is going to say later, 
that at the beginning of the passage Leibniz is presupposing a distinction between 
substance and accident in precisely those terms: several things are predicated of both 
substances and accidents, but while a substance is predicated of no other subject, an 
accident is predicated of other subjects.
4
 
 It is also important to note that, in a sense, LeiďŶiz͛s iŶitial defiŶition of substance 
does not have a substance as an ultimate subject of predication. An ultimate subject of 
predication in this sense is a subject of predication that is not predicated of any subject. 
But Leibniz says that a substance is not attributed to, or predicated of, any other subject. 
This suggests that for Leibniz a substance can be predicated of itself and so, in this sense, 
it is not an ultimate subject of predication. Indeed there are texts where Leibniz says that 
a suďstaŶĐe is attƌiďuted to oƌ pƌediĐated of itself: ͚But the ĐoŶĐept of a suďsisteŶt thiŶg, 
for instance of this fire, is such that it includes all the attributes that can be said of that 
same thing of which itself [i.e. the subsistent thing – GR-P] caŶ ďe said͛,5 oƌ ͚Fuƌtheƌŵoƌe, 
a singular substance is that which cannot be said of another. Or if a singular substance is 
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said of soŵethiŶg, it is said of itself͛. Since the concept of a certain fire includes all that 
can be said of that fire, the former passage implies that the fire can be said of itself.
6
 
This might seem a trivial and minor point, but we shall see later that this is one of 
the keǇs to uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg LeiďŶiz͛s ĐoŶĐeptioŶ of suďstaŶĐe in the Discourse on 
Metaphysics. It might seem that this introduces a non-AƌistoteliaŶ eleŵeŶt iŶto LeiďŶiz͛s 
definition, since Aristotle famously said that suďstaŶĐe is ͚that ǁhiĐh is Ŷeitheƌ said of Ŷoƌ 
iŶ a suďjeĐt͛ ;Categories 5, 2a12-13), thereby seeming to exclude the possibility that a 
subject be predicated of itself. But Aristotle does allow for the possibility of a subject to be 
predicated of itself, since in the Prior Analytics, for instance, he says that individuals like 
Cleon and Callias cannot be predicated of anything else truly and universally.
7
 In any case, 
we shall see later that for Leibniz the sense in which a substance is predicated of or 
attributed to itself is that its concept is attributed to it.  
Leibniz says that this Aristotelian explanation of substance is insufficient and 
merely nominal. Leibniz usually speaks of definitions being nominal.
8
 Although in this 
passage he speaks of a nominal explanation, since what he is calling nominal has the 
aspect of a definition, it is plausible to think that Leibniz means what he usually means 
when he speaks of nominal definitions. For Leibniz nominal definitions contain only marks 
that would enable one to distinguish the thing defined from other things,
9
 but they do not 
establish that the thing defined is possible. Thus as long as we have only a nominal 
definition we do not know whether the definition contains a contradiction.
10
 Real 
definitions, on the contrary, establish the possibility of the thing defined.
11
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 See A VI.iv: 1617. IŶteƌestiŶglǇ, LeiďŶiz͛s Đlaiŵ that the AƌistoteliaŶ defiŶitioŶ of suďstaŶĐe is iŶsuffiĐieŶt 
finds a precedent in Aristotle himself: ͚We have now outlined the nature of substance, showing that it is that 
which is not predicated of a stratum, but of which all else is predicated. But we must not merely state the 
At the end of the first paragraph of the passage from the Discourse quoted above 
Leibniz suggests that to find a real definition of substance one must consider what it is to 
be truly attributed to a subject. Thus, although he does not say it explicitly, Leibniz 
suggests that the idea of true predication or attribution might conceal a contradiction or 
impossibility. Based on his considerations concerning what it is to be truly attributed to, or 
predicated of, a subject, Leibniz produces a different definition of a substance. 




Leibniz goes on to consider what it is to be truly attributed to, or predicated of, a 
subject. He says that, given that all true predication has a basis in the nature of things, the 
subject term always contains the predicate term. This is his famous theory of truth which, 
in other texts, he puts in terms of concepts: the concept of the subject always contains the 
concept of the predicate. This is why this theory is sometimes called the Concept 
Containment Theory of Truth. But sometimes Leibniz speaks simply of the subject 
containing the predicate.
13
 Although in the Discourse on Metaphysics Leibniz initially 
speaks of the subject containing the predicate, the reference to notions or concepts is 
present there, since he says that because the subject always contains the predicate, ͚he 
who understood perfectly the notion of the subject would also judge that the predicate 
ďeloŶgs to it͛ ;ŵǇ eŵphasisͿ, and then he goes on to speak of the notion of the subject 
containing the predicates of the subject. I do not want to make much of this since I think 
Leibniz took all these different formulations of his theory of truth as equivalent.
14
 But I 
shall use the version of the theory that according to which the concept of the subject 
always contains the predicate.  
                                                                                                                                                                 
matter thus; for this is not enough. The statement itself is obscure, and further, on this view, matter 
becomes substance͛ (Metaphysics 1029a7–10). 
12
 Joseph suggests that the nominal character of the definition of substance is due to the fact that it is not 
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that the possible incompatibility of those two characters is not what worried him, since he simply 
concentrates on explaining what true predication consists in and does not refer at all to the fact that a 
substance can be predicated of itself. 
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Thus, according to Leibniz, for a predicate to be truly attributed to a subject is for it 
to be included in the concept of the subject. His theory is intended to be perfectly general 
and it is intended to apply to all propositions whatever their subject matter. Indeed it 
would be very odd if for Leibniz only propositions about some entities were such that the 
concept of the subject contains the predicate. For then it would hardly be the case that 
͚all true predication has some ground in the nature of things͛.  
It might be controversial whether Leibniz has, in any sense, clarified the notion of 
predication by defining it as the relation of inclusion of the predicate in the concept of the 
subject. But what should not be controversial is that he has not thereby put himself in a 
position to give a real definition of substance on the basis of that notion of predication. 
For he has done nothing to show that there is no contradiction or impossibility concealed 




Finally, note the conflation Leibniz makes between the Aristotelian notions of 
͚ďeiŶg said of͛ aŶd ͚ďeiŶg iŶ͛ a suďjeĐt. IŶ the fiƌst paƌagƌaph LeiďŶiz seeŵs to ďe 
concerned with the former notion since he is concerned with attribution and predication. 
But when clarifying this notion in the second paragraph he says that this is what 
philosophers call in-esse when they say that the predicate is in the subject (Joseph notes 
that Leibniz ignores this Aristotelian distinction).
16
 What is most extraordinary is that 
Leibniz is implicitly attributing his theory of truth to Aristotle, something he does explicitly 
in other texts, for instance Notationes Generales,
17




3. In the third paragraph of the passage from section 8 of the Discourse quoted above 
Leibniz appears to derive a definition of substance from his theory of truth. What he says 
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suggests, and is often glossed as meaning, that the nature of a substance is to have a 
concept that is complete in the sense of including and allowing deduction of all its 




Now, it is true that for Leibniz a substance has a complete concept that contains or 
includes all its predicates and therefore it contains or includes everything that is true of it. 
And that a substance has a concept that includes all its predicates follows from LeiďŶiz͛s 
theory of truth. For according to this theory the predicate is always included in the 
concept of the subject. Thus the concept of the subject must contain all the predicates of 
the subject. Since according to Leibniz a substance is the subject of predicates, its concept 
must contain all of them. But being something whose concept contains all its predicates is 
not the definition of a substance. Indeed attributing to Leibniz such a definition of 
substance would be deeply problematic, as we shall now see.  
 For surely accidents can be subjects of predication. And that they are seems to be 
consistent, as I said, with the merely nominal definition of substance with which Leibniz 
begins the passage we are discussing. Now, if accidents are subjects of predication, given 
that all true predication consists in the concept of the subject containing the predicate, 
and that this is the reason why substances have complete concepts that contain all their 
predicates, then accidents should have complete concepts too. But if accidents have 
complete concepts that contain or include all their predicates, then having such concepts 
is not what defines a substance.
20
  
 Thus either Leibniz produced an extensionally incorrect definition of substance, or 
his definition of substance is not that of a being whose concept contains or includes all its 
predicates.  
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 From now on, for simplicity and convenience only, I shall speak of concepts including or containing 
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 This problem has been noted by Parkinson (1965: 125–26) and Rutherford (1988: 131, 1995: 120). 
Parkinson presents the problems in terms of abstractions rather than accidents and Rutherford presents it in 
terms of species rather than accidents. But the problem is the same as the one I am presenting in terms of 
aĐĐideŶts: LeiďŶiz͛s theoƌǇ of tƌuth oŶ its own does not seem to produce a definition that applies only to 
suďstaŶĐes. I pƌefeƌ to foƌŵulate the pƌoďleŵ iŶ teƌŵs of aĐĐideŶts ďeĐause LeiďŶiz͛s iŶteŶtioŶ, iŶ the 
passage I am analyzing, is to distinguish substances from accidents.  
 4. It might be argued that Leibniz rejected the existence of accidents, and therefore 
LeiďŶiz͛s defiŶitioŶ of a suďstaŶĐe is Ŷot eǆteŶsioŶallǇ incorrect. On this view, accidents do 
not exist and so they do not satisfy his definition of a substance. And, indeed, there are 
texts in which Leibniz seems to reject accidents, for instance the De realitate accidentium, 
where Leibniz argues that what appears to be talk of accidents is in fact an abbreviated 
way of talking about substances.
21
 One might then think that for Leibniz accidents are not 




But I do Ŷot thiŶk LeiďŶiz͛s NoŵiŶalisŵ, according to which accidents are not part 
of created reality, is playing a ƌole iŶ LeiďŶiz͛s aƌguŵeŶt foƌ his defiŶitioŶ of iŶdiǀidual 
substance. For although there is textual evidence for attributing Nominalism to Leibniz, as 
we have seen,
23
 LeiďŶiz͛s ǀieǁs oŶ the oŶtologiĐal status of aĐĐideŶts aƌe Ŷot staďle. Theƌe 
are texts in which Leibniz commits to a denial of their reality, and there are texts in which 
Leibniz commits to an affirmation of their reality (for instance, A VI.iv: 2770, G.iv.364, and 
G.vii.401).  
It is interesting to note that in section 8 of the Discourse on Metaphysics, when he 
is distinguishing substances from accidents, Leibniz says that an accident is a being whose 
notion does not contain everything that can be attributed to the subject to which this 
notion is attributed. This, however, is consistent with his Nominalism. For Leibniz uses the 
ǁoƌd ͚ďeiŶg͛ iŶ a ǀeƌǇ geŶeƌal ǁaǇ, to applǇ to ǁhateǀeƌ is distiŶĐtlǇ ĐoŶĐeiǀaďle or 
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 A line like this is suggested by some passages of Rutherford, who at one point claims that he has 
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possible.
24
 In this sense abstract things are beings, even if they do not exist in the created 
world. 
But then Nominalism seems unable to play any ƌole iŶ LeiďŶiz͛s aƌguŵeŶt foƌ his 
definition of substance. For Leibniz is interested in the essence or nature of substance. 
That is why he is after a definition of substance. Such a definition should apply to no 
possible or conceivable being distinct from a substance. Thus whether accidents exist or 
not is irrelevant when it comes to distinguishing substances from accidents.   
It might be claimed that that something is an entity does not guarantee that it is a 
subject of predication. In the philosophy of Frege, for instance, concepts are entities but 
they cannot be referred to. So why could not Leibniz maintain that accidents are entities 
but they are not subjects of predication? In that case accidents cannot satisfy the 
definition of substance. But there are at least three problems with this suggestion: (a) 
there are texts where Leibniz commits to the idea that accidents are subjects of 
predication (see, e.g., G.ii.247); (b) there seems to be no principled reason, in the 
philosophy of Leibniz, why any genuine beings should not be subjects of predication; and 
(c) nothing in the Discourse suggests this view.   
But, in fact, there is no need to save Leibniz by attributing to him, in the Discourse 
on Metaphysics, the view that accidents are not existent entities or that they are not 
suďjeĐts of pƌediĐatioŶ. Foƌ LeiďŶiz͛s defiŶitioŶ of suďstaŶĐe iŶ the Discourse is such that 
there is no reason to think that it might be satisfied by accidents, even if they exist and are 
genuine subjects of predication, as we shall see in the next section. 
 
5. Leibniz does not say that the nature of a substance is to have a notion or concept that 
contains all its predicates. Instead he says that the nature of a substance is to have a 
notion or concept that contains all the predicates of the subject to which this notion is 
attributed. Now, the only thing of which the notion or concept of a substance is truly 
predicated is that substance itself. This clarifies the sense in which a substance is 
predicated of itself: strictly speaking, it is the concept or notion of a substance that is 
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predicated of the substance in question. That a substance is attributed to or predicated of 
itself is a metonymic way of saying that the concept of a substance is attributed to or 
predicated of the substance in question. 
And so, since a substance has a concept that contains all the predicates of the 
subject to which that concept is attributed, or of which it is predicated, and that subject is 
itself, it follows that a substance has a complete concept that contains all its predicates.
25
 
But that a substance has a complete concept that contains all its predicates is not the 
definition of substance itself. The definition of substance, as I have said, is that a 
substance has a concept that contains all the predicates of the subject to which this notion 
is attributed. 
What is the significance of this? That it allows Leibniz to maintain that accidents 
are genuine subjects of predication without making them satisfy his definition of 
suďstaŶĐe. Foƌ ǁhat LeiďŶiz saǇs is that aŶ ͚aĐĐideŶt is a ďeing whose notion does not 
include everything that can be attributed to the subject to which this notion is attributed͛. 
That is, the concept of an accident does not contain all the predicates of the subject to 
which that concept is attributed or of which it is predicated. Thus what distinguishes a 
substance from an accident is that the concept of the former contains everything that is 
true of the subject to which that concept is attributed, while the concept of the latter 
does not contain everything that is true of the subject to which that concept is attributed.  
Thus Leibniz can have an adequate definition of substance without assuming 
nominalism or even positively assuming the reality of accidents.  
It might be thought that if Leibniz thinks that it follows from his theory of truth 
that a substance has a concept that contains all the predicates of the subject to which that 
concept is attributed, he should think that it also follows from the theory of truth that an 
accident has a concept that contains all the predicates of the subject to which that 
concept is attributed. Therefore, it might be objected, Leibniz is not in a position to 
distinguish between substances and accidents.   
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 As we saw in section 3, that a substance has a complete concept that contains all its predicates is also a 
direct consequence of the theory of truth, given that substances are subjects of predication. 
This point of view reveals a false representation of what Leibniz is doing in the 
passage under discussion. Leibniz is not simply advancing a theory of truth from which, 
and from which alone, he infers a definition of substance. Instead he is using a theory of 
truth to clarify the notion of true predication in order to render real the merely nominal 
Aristotelian definition of substance put forward at the beginning of our passage. 
According to this merely nominal definition, although several things are predicated of a 
substance, a substance is predicated of no other subject. This suggests that a substance is 
predicated of itself and only of itself. And if it is accepted that a substance is predicated 
only of itself then, given that true predication consists in the predicate being included in 
the concept of the subject, the concept of the substance will contain all the predicates of 
the subject to which it is attributed, and thus it will contain all its own predicates, that is, 
all the predicates of that substance itself. But it does not follow that an accident has a 
concept that contains all the predicates of the subjects to which that concept is attributed. 
For an accident, Leibniz thought, is attributed to subjects other than itself.  
In effect since an accident is typically attributed to subjects other than itself, and 
these subjects are the bearers of different and sometimes incompatible predicates, the 
concept of an accident does not contain all the predicates of the subjects to which its 
concept is attributed, since otherwise such a concept would be inconsistent. 
 
6. But note that Leibniz can, and indeed must, maintain that accidents have complete 
concepts that include everything that is true of them. To see this, consider the accident 
being king. What is its concept?  
There are two possible answers. On the one hand, there is the concept king, which 
is a concept that is attributed to and predicated of kings. This is the concept that is 
attributed to both Alexander and Darius. On the other hand, there is the concept 
kinghood. This concept is not attributed to Alexander or Darius, or to any other man, but 
to an accident, namely the accident being king. The latter concept is the concept of a 
certain accident because it characterizes that accident. The former concept is the concept 
of a certain accident because it characterizes the subjects of that accident in virtue of 
those subjects having that accident.  
Furthermore, the concept kinghood should be considered to be complete by 
Leibniz. For take the collection of all the true predications about the accident being king. 
In all of them a certain predicate is attributed to the accident being king (e.g. that it is an 
accident, that it is an accident had by powerful men, that it is an accident many men 
desire to have, etc.). But since the concept of the subject includes everything that is true 
of it, the concept kinghood must include everything that is true of the accident being king. 
For the concept kinghood is the concept that characterizes the accident being king.  
But the concept king does not completely characterize the subjects to which it 
applies. For this concept is attributed to men like Alexander and Darius, but the concept 
king does not contain everything that is true of them since being a king does not exhaust 
what they are. So it is because Leibniz is thinking of concepts like king that he says that an 
accident is something whose concept does not contain everything that is true of the 
subject to which it applies.  
In general, then, one must distinguish between two kinds of concepts of accidents: 
(a) the concept of an accident F in the sense of being the concept that characterises F, and 
(b) the concept of an accident F in the sense of being the concept that characterises the 
subjects of F in virtue of those subjects having accident F. It should be clear that, in 
general, a concept of an accident in sense (b) is not a concept of an accident in sense (a), 
since the concept that characterises the subjects of the accident need not characterise the 
accident itself. This is what happens in the case of the concepts king and kinghood.
26
 
Now, assumiŶg that eǀeƌǇ eŶtitǇ is the suďjeĐt of soŵe tƌue pƌediĐatioŶs, LeiďŶiz͛s 
idea that the concept of the subject always contains its predicates, ensures that every 
entity has a complete concept corresponding to sense (a). For take the collection of true 
predications about a certain entity X. In all of them a predicate is attributed to X. So the 
concept of X must include all those predicates, whether X is a substance, an accident, or 
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 Of course, when the accident is one of its own subjects, like with the accident being an accident, the 
concept of the accident in sense (b) is also a concept of the accident in sense (a). But this is not the typical 
case, and it is not the kind of case that Leibniz has in mind in section 8 of the Discourse.  
any other entity. In this respect, substances and accidents are on a par: both have 
complete concepts that completely characterise them. Indeed every entity has a concept 
that completely characterises it. Thus not only can Leibniz maintain that accidents have 
complete concepts that include everything that is true of them, he must maintain this.  
But accidents do not have complete concepts in sense (b). A complete concept of 
an accident in sense (b) would completely characterize the subjects of that accident. For 
instance, if the concept king were complete, it would completely characterize Alexander, 
and it would therefore contain everything that is true of him. But then either the concept 
king would not be attributable to Darius or any king other than Alexander, or Alexander 
would have only the properties that follow from being a king, which means that he would 
not have been taught by Aristotle, for instance. That concepts of accidents in sense (b) are 
not complete is what Leibniz means when he says in the Discourse that the notion of an 




Thus, although an accident has a complete concept in sense (a), it has an 
incomplete concept in sense (b). But substances cannot have incomplete concepts in 
sense (b). For, as we have seen, Leibniz conflated the relations of predication and 
inherence and he often says that a substance is a subject that is not in another subject, 
thereby suggesting that a substance is a subject that is or might be its own only subject of 
inherence.
28
 And, as we shall see in the next section, the idea that a substance is its own 
subject helps us best understand a passage that is very relevant to our purposes. Taking 
the possibility that substances are their own subjects of inherence seriously, we can draw 
the following distinction between concepts of a substance, analogous to the previous 
distinction between concepts of accidents: (a) the concept of a substance X in the sense of 
being the concept that characterises X, and (b) the concept of a substance X in the sense 
of being the concept that characterises the subject of X in virtue of its being X.  
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 Note that even the concept accident, when taken in sense (b), is not complete, since accidents include 
more than merely being accidents.   
28
 A VI.iv: 672, 1506–07.  
But since a substance is its own only subject, a complete concept of a substance in 
sense (a) is a complete concept of that substance in sense (b). For the same reason, a 
complete concept of a substance in sense (b) is a complete concept of that substance in 
sense (a). Thus a substance cannot have a complete concept in sense (a) without having a 
complete concept in sense (b). IŶ shoƌt, LeiďŶiz͛s defiŶitioŶ of suďstaŶĐe iŶ the Discourse is 




7. Since a substance is its own only subject, in the case of substances concepts in sense (a) 
and concepts in sense (b) apply to one and the same thing, and in this sense they can be 
said to coincide. In a note appended to a letter to Arnauld of 14
th
 July of 1686, Leibniz 
makes the following distinction between a full and a complete notion or concept: ͚A full 
;͚pleŶa͛Ϳ ŶotioŶ ĐoŶtaiŶs all the pƌediĐates of the thiŶg, foƌ iŶstaŶĐe of heat; a Đoŵplete 
notion contains all the predicates of the subject, for instance of this hot thing. These 
ŶotioŶs ĐoiŶĐide iŶ iŶdiǀidual suďstaŶĐes͛ ;G.ii.49).  
 According to this note the full ŶotioŶ ĐoŵpletelǇ ĐhaƌaĐteƌises a ͚thiŶg͛, aŶd the 
Đoŵplete ŶotioŶ ĐoŵpletelǇ ĐhaƌaĐteƌises the suďjeĐt of the ͚thiŶg͛. This suggests that a 
full notion is a complete concept in sense (a), whilst a complete notion is a complete 
concept in sense (b). He then says that in substances full and complete notions coincide, 
which I take to mean that full and complete notions of substances apply to or characterise 
the same thing. Since Leibniz uses an accident, namely heat, as an example of what is 
characterised by a full notion, and the corresponding subject of the accident as an 
example of what is characterized by a complete notion, the implication of the passage is 
that the full and complete notions of an accident do not characterise the same thing. The 
passage also suggests (although, clearly, does not say so explicitly) that accidents do not 
have complete notions – that is, the passage suggests that, as I have been arguing with 
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 Note that if conceived in a more traditional way, as not inhering in any subject, substances do not have 
incomplete concepts in sense (b). For if substances do not have subjects where they inhere, they do not 
have concepts in sense (b). Their only concepts are concepts in sense (a) and so they do not have incomplete 
concepts in sense (b). Thus, whether or not substances are their own subjects, they do not have incomplete 
concepts in sense (b). If Leibniz had worked with this more traditional conception of substance he should 
have defined them as things that do not have incomplete concepts in sense (b). 
respect to section 8 of the Discourse on Metaphysics, accidents do not have complete 
concepts in sense (b). Otherwise we would have to attribute to Leibniz the very un-
Leibnizian view that the concept hot thing includes all the predicates of a certain hot 
thing. 
This note has not passed unnoticed by commentators. Commentating on it, 
Parkinson says that the difference between full and complete concepts is that full 
concepts can, but complete concepts cannot, form part of a more complex concept than 
itself. Indeed for Parkinson a concept is complete if and only if it cannot form part of a 
concept more complex than itself.
30
 The rationale for this seems to be that the concept of 
Alexander contains the concept kingship (which I take to be the concept king) but it is not 
contained in any other more complex concepts.
31
   
 But PaƌkiŶsoŶ͛s aĐĐouŶt of the distiŶĐtioŶ ďetǁeeŶ full aŶd Đoŵplete ĐoŶĐepts 
seems to be incorrect. For Leibniz says that the full concept of heat contains all its 
predicates. But the predicates of heat are not predicates of hot things. Heat is an accident, 
hot things are not. So the full concept of heat cannot be part of more complex concepts of 
hot things. But neither can it be a part of a concept of another accident. For it if it were, 
heat would be attributable to another accident, and so another accident would be heat. 
Thus a full notion cannot be part of a more complex concept.  
Rutherford correctly says that it is reasonable to suppose that a full notion is to be 
identified with the kind of concept that is demanded of the subject term of any true 
pƌopositioŶ ďǇ LeiďŶiz͛s theoƌǇ of tƌuth.32 And then Rutherford accounts for the distinction 
between full and complete notions in this way: ͚A full teƌŵ ĐoŶtaiŶs eǀeƌǇ term whose 
predication it entails. However, it places no bounds on there being terms which entail the 
predication it expresses. By contrast, there can be no term which entails the predication 
expressed by a complete term, since by definition it contains every term predicable of the 
saŵe suďjeĐt͛ (1988: 141).  
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 Parkinson 1965: 127.  
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 Rutherford 1988: 131. 
The way Rutherford characterises full terms or notions does not seem to accord 
with his idea that full notions are those demanded of the subject term of any true 
pƌopositioŶ ďǇ LeiďŶiz͛s theoƌǇ of tƌuth. Foƌ LeiďŶiz͛s theoƌǇ of tƌuth deŵaŶds that the 
subject term of any true proposition has a complete concept that completely 
characterises it. And so the full notion of heat completely characterises it. Indeed, a full 
notion is a complete concept in sense (a). The concepts whose terms place no bounds on 
there being terms which entail the predications they express are concepts of accidents in 
sense (b). These are incomplete, and so are neither full nor complete. As I have argued, 
when Leibniz says that an accident does not have a concept that includes everything that 
is true of the subject to which that concept is attributed, what he means is that the 
concept of an accident in sense (b) is incomplete. Thus the distinction between full and 
complete notions is the distinction between complete concepts in sense (a) and complete 
concepts in sense (b).  
 
8. There are passages where Leibniz explicitly affirms that containing all the predicates of 
the thing to which a concept is attributed is a sufficient condition for being the concept of 
a substance. Here is one such text: 
 
If there is a complete notion, namely such that from it a reason can be given for all 
the predicates of that subject to which this notion can be attributed, it will be a 
notion of an individual substance, and vice versa. For an individual substance is a 
subject which is not in any other subject, but in which other things are, and thus all 
the predicates of the same subject are all the predicates of the same individual 
substance; of them a reason can be given from the notion of the individual 
substance, and from it alone…. Thus a ŶotioŶ that does this is certainly a notion of 
the individual substance itself (A VI.iv: 672). 
 
This is from a text known as Principium scientiae humanae,
33
 tentatively dated as roughly 
contemporary to the Discourse. This passage entails that accidents do not have complete 
concepts in sense (a). For such a complete concept would contain all the predicates of the 
accident in question. But according to this passage a concept that contains all the 
predicates of the thing to which it applies is the concept of a substance.  
 There is also a passage from a text likely to have been written in mid-1685, where 
Leibniz says that only a singular substance has a complete concept.
34
 And there is also this 
passage, from On the present world, tentatively dated between the Spring of 1684 and the 
Winter of 1685–86: 
 
 And, in fact, the concept of an individual substance is something complete, which 
already potentially contains everything whatever can be understood of it.
35
 Thus, 
God, while conceiving the substance of this Peter, he thereby conceives all things 
that have happened or will happen to him. Which cannot be said of an individual 
accident, except insofar as it is conceived to be in an individual substance. From the 
royal authority of Alphonso I cannot conceive his Astronomy, unless I access the 
individual nature of Alphonso hiŵself. ;…Ϳ [A suďstaŶĐe] is also uŶiƋue, ďeĐause of 
the fact that its concept is complete, by force of its very essence. But a complete 
concept is a characteƌistiĐ [͚Ŷota͛] of an individual substance (A VI.iv: 1507). 
 
These passages do not permit a distinction between substance and accident. Thus if my 
interpretation of section 8 of the Discourse on Metaphysics is correct, the Discourse 
ƌepƌeseŶts aŶ eǀolutioŶ iŶ LeiďŶiz͛s thought oŶ suďstaŶĐe, siŶĐe he is fiŶallǇ aďle to giǀe a 
definition of substance in terms of complete concepts that distinguishes between 
substance and accident. Although this does not settle the date of the texts presented in 
this section, it does suggest that they were written before the Discourse on Metaphysics. 
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 A VI.iv: 626.  
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 In this seŶteŶĐe ͚it͛ tƌaŶslates ͚ipso͛, ǁhiĐh I ďelieǀe to ďe a tǇpo foƌ ͚ipsa͛. “ee the Ŷeǆt footŶote foƌ the 
LatiŶ teǆt ĐoƌƌespoŶdiŶg to this passage: ͚Et quidem substantiae singularis conceptus est quiddam 
completum, qui omnia jam virtute continet, quaecunque de ipso possuŶt iŶtelligi͛. 
 ϵ. It is iŵpoƌtaŶt to Ŷote that eǀeŶ if LeiďŶiz͛s defiŶitioŶ is aďle to suĐĐessfullǇ distiŶguish 
between substances and accidents, it might not be able to successfully distinguish 
between substances and other entities. For instance, consider the property being 
Alexander. Alexander is Alexander in virtue of having the property being Alexander. So the 
concept Alexander characterizes Alexander, the subject of the property being Alexander, 
in virtue of Alexander having that property. Does that concept characterize Alexander 
completely? It depends on how the property being Alexander is understood. But suppose 
that from the property being Alexander all the properties of Alexander can be deduced. 
Then the concept Alexander completely characterizes Alexander, the subject of the 
property of being Alexander, in virtue of this subject having that property. So this property 
has a complete concept in sense (b) and so it satisfies the definition of a substance.
36
  
But being Alexander is not an accident for Leibniz. For being Alexander is 
attributable only to Alexander and so it does not satisfy what seems to be the intended 
nominal definition of an accident, namely that accidents are attributable to more than one 
subject. Indeed, as Leibniz implies in section 8, accidents are not sufficiently determinate 
for one individual. But being Alexander is sufficiently determinate for one individual. Thus 
being Alexander is not an accident. It is, rather, a particular sort of property, an individual 
essence or, using the language of the Discourse, a substantial form. And so the problem is 
that LeiďŶiz͛s defiŶitioŶ of suďstaŶĐe does Ŷot alloǁ hiŵ to distiŶguish suďstaŶĐes fƌoŵ 
their substantial forms. Whether this is an important problem is itself a delicate problem, 





10. I haǀe aƌgued that LeiďŶiz͛s Đoŵplete-concept definition of substance in section 8 of 
the Discourse on Metaphysics allows Leibniz to distinguish between substances and 
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 I am indebted to Jeff Snapper for this point.  
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 A similar problem would be in terms of the conjunction of all accidents of Alexander. That collection will 
have a complete concept in sense (b), since that concept will completely describe Alexander. Again, Leibniz 
should not consider such a conjunction of accidents as an accident since it is not attributable to more than 
one subject. 
accidents. The key is the merely nominal definition according to which a substance can be 
predicated of itself and only of itself. What this means is that the concept of a substance is 
attributed only to the suďstaŶĐe iŶ ƋuestioŶ. “iŶĐe LeiďŶiz͛s theoƌǇ of tƌuth has it that the 
predicate is always included in the concept of the subject, and the concept of a substance 
is attributed only to the substance in question, this permits Leibniz to define a substance 
as having a concept so complete that it includes all the predicates of the subject to which 
this notion is attributed rather than merely as having a concept so complete that it 
includes all its predicates. The latter definition would not allow Leibniz to distinguish 
substances from accidents since accidents also have complete concepts that include all 
their predicates. But since accidents do not have complete concepts that include all the 
pƌediĐates of the suďjeĐts to ǁhiĐh theǇ aƌe attƌiďuted, LeiďŶiz͛s aĐtual definition of 
substance does allow him to distinguish substances from accidents. I used these ideas to 
elucidate an interesting note where Leibniz distinguishes full and complete concepts or 
notions and I argued that the definition of substance in the Discourse represents progress 
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